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PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
The parties to this proceeding are:
Fay Gaw:

Plaintiff/Appellant

State of Utah, by and
through its Dept.
of Transportation:

Defendant/Respondent

Jimmy Wray Lingle:

Defendant/Respondent

Allstate Insurance
Co., an Illinois
corporation:

Defendant/Respondent

Roadrunner Trucking,
a New Mexico
corporation:

Defendant/Respondent.
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IV,
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Appellate jurisdiction is derived from Utah Code Ann. §78-22 (3)(j) and Article VIII Section 3 of the Utah Constitution.
This is a negligence action.

This appeal arises after a

full jury trial in which judgment was granted for defendants.
Other defendants were dismissed earlier on summary judgment.
V.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
AND ORDINANCES

Article VIII Section 3, Utah Constitution

1

Rule 30(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

13

Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence

4, 8

Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 ( 3 ) ( j )

1

1

VI.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Did the trial court err by failing to receive testimony
on the ultimate issue of the case?
Did the trial court err by instructing the jury on per
se negligence, as opposed to prima facia negligence?
Did the trial court correctly dismiss the State of
Utah?
Did the trial court err by failing to instruct the jury
that a driver who enjoys the right of way still has a
duty of due care?

9

VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff and appellant Fay Gaw (hereafter Gaw) was injured
in a car/truck collision.

She was paralyzed from the waist down.

(R. 510.)
The truck was driven by defendant Jimmy Wray Lingle.
(Hereafter Lingle.) (R. 510.)

The truck was owned and operated

by defendant Road Runner Trucking.
occurred on a state highway.

(R. 509.)

The incident

(R. 510.)

Carbon County and the City of Helper were dismissed and no
claim is made against them in this appeal.

(R. 218, 387.)

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
State of Utah.

(R. 1376.)

parties remained:

At the time of trial, only three

the injured party (Gaw), the truck driver

(Lingle), and Lingle's employer (Roadrunner Trucking).
The jury returned a verdict allocating 75% negligence to
plaintiff Gaw and 25% negligence to defendant Lingle. (R. 1671.)
Gaw appeals.
VIII.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT ONE
An issue in the case was whether or not Gaw acted reasonably
in turning left onto the highway.

Gaw proffered expert testimony

that the markings on the intersection were confusing, and that

Gaw was misled or confused by the markings.

The expert further

testified that she acted reasonably as she attempted to follow
the confusing signs.

The trial court rejected that testimony on

the grounds that an expert could not testify on an ultimate
issue.

However, the trial court failed to follow Rule 704, Utah

Rules of Evidence which specifically states that an expert may
testify on an ultimate issue.
POINT TWO
The trial court gave three instructions on per se
negligence.

That was clear error.

The Utah Supreme Court has

consistently rejected the doctrine of per se negligence.

Rather

Utah has adopted the doctrine of prima facia negligence.

See

e.g. Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1984).
POINT THREE
The State of Utah designed the intersection where the
accident occurred.

There is testimony that the design was

confusing and not up to design standards.
testimony that she was not confused.

Gaw gave deposition

Based upon that deposition

testimony, the State of Utah was granted summary judgment.
However, the testimony on confusion was taken out of context.
Gaw also testified in the same deposition that she was confused.
Further, there was expert testimony that Gaw was confused.
Finally, the simple fact is that people can be confused without
realizing it.

4

POINT FOUR
The trial court instructed the jury on the law of right of
way.

However, the Court erred by failing to instruct that the

favored driver has a duty of due care even though he may have the
right of way.
IX.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO PERMTT
GAW'S EXPERT TO TESTIFY ON THE ULTIMATE ISSUE
A.

PROFFERED TESTIMONY
Gaw's expert testified in. chambers that:
Mrs. Gaw was behaving in a way that she
thought. . . was proper to behave in making
the left turn. . . (Tr. 242, Lines 19-23.)

The expert further clarified his scientific analysis of the
accident:
Well I avoid using the term prudent and
negligent in regard to behavior, because
those are legal terms of art. . . I have
given my opinion with regard to the
reasonableness of users of the roadway, not
just these two individual users. (Tr. 256,
Lines 14-20.)
The human factors expert further testified that in view of
all the factors, Mrs. Gaw's conduct was reasonable (Tr. 245,

5

Lines 1-6, 246, Lines 14-22), and the conduct of the truck
driver (defendant Lingle) was not reasonable.1
12-14.)

(Tr. 252, Lines

If the truck driver's conduct had been reasonable, the

accident could have been avoided, or at least greatly reduced in
impact. (Tr. 253, Lines 7-10.)
B.

QUALIFICATIONS OF GAW'S EXPERT
Gaw's expert was a human factors research scientist.

Human factors research is a joint activity betwe€m engineers and
behavioral scientists.

The purpose of human factors research is

to design systems in the environment that are compatible with
human limitations.
human factors.

Over fifty universities grant degrees in

(Tr. 230, Lines 17-21.)

A classic example of the need for human factors scientists
was the World War II battleship.

At that time, gun turrets would

crush the crew if allowed to turn to its maximum extent.
231, Lines 5-9.)

(Tr.

In other words, the machinery did not fit the

human being.
Plaintiff's expert specializes in human factors as applied
to highway transportation.

(Tr. 232, Lines 8-25,)

Specifically,

his research has been involved one way or another in virtually
all traffic control devices on the road today.
24-25.)

(Tr. 232, Lines

That includes intersections (such as the one in this

1

The truck driver faiLed to reduce speed for a yellow
blinking light. (Tr. 250, Lines 8-25; 251, Lines 1-14.)
6

case) where the traffic control devices are painted on the
pavement.

(Tr. 234, Lines 24-25; 235, Lines 8-25.)

He has done

research for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(Tr. 237, Lines 17-25), and he has been an advisor to the
National Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for over
twenty years. (Tr. 234, Lines 14-16.)

This committee publishes a

manual of standards which is adopted by virtually every state and
the federal government.

The manual is used by traffic engineers

when they design roads and intersections.
C.

(Id.)

COURTfS RULING
The trial court cut the heart out of the proffered

testimony.

The trial court judge said:
. . . [T]he determination of
prudent conduct is under the
explained to the jury is not
expert can testify to. (Tr.

what reasonable,
legal term as
an area that an
268, Lines 3-6.)

However, the trial judge did grant "half-a-loaf".
Specifically the court ruled that:
. . . [W]e will allow the witness to. . .
give his opinions on whether or not the
markings could confuse.
(Tr. 269, Lines 16-18. )
Still the expert was not permitted to testify as to the
conduct of the truck driver, nor was he permitted to testify
whether Mrs. Gaw's conduct was reasonable.

7

D.

ADMISSIBILITY OF HUMAN FACTORS TESTIMONY

Courts have routinely received expert testimony from human
factors scientists:

See e.g. Wright v. Las Vegas Hacienda, 720

P.2d 696 (Nev. 1986); Buchman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co.,
381
So.2d 229 (Fla. 1980); Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d
530 (N.D. 1977); Scott v. Sears & Roebuck, 789 F.2d 1052 (4th
Cir. 1986); Collins v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 675 F.2d
1185 (1982); Public Health Foundation, Etc. v. Cole, 352 So.2d
877 (Fla.App. 1977).
E.

LEGAL BASIS FOR COURT RULING
It appears that no one seriously questioned the

expert's credentials.

It also appears that there* was no serious

issue as to whether the expert testimony might be helpful to the
jury.

(See Rule 702 "If. . . specialized knowledge will assist

the trier of fact. . . an expert may testify thereto. . .")
Obviously his testimony was helpful.

See e.g. United States v.

Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3rd.Cir. 1985).

See also 7

Wigmore, Evidence, §1923 (Chadbourne Rev. 1978)
Rather, the court was concerned that the expert should not
testify on the ultimate issue of the case, viz. the
reasonableness of the conduct of both drivers.

(See Tr. 268,

Lines 6-10.)
The issue is covered by Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence.

8

Testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue. • .
The jury was deprived of helpful testimony, on the
reasonableness of the conduct of Gaw and Lingle.

The failure to

receive testimony on the ultimate issue invites misunderstanding
and confusion in the jury's minds.

Edwards v. Didericksen, 597

P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah 1979).
In Collins By and Through Kay v. Seaboard, Etc., 675 F.2d
1185 (11th Cir. 1982) the court noted that it would be "absurd"
to suppose that human factors testimony would not be helpful in
evaluating the dangers of a'complicated railroad crossing; and
that an appeal attacking such expert testimony would be
"frivolous".

See also Buchman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 381

So.2d 229 (Fla. 1980) .
F.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for rejecting expert testimony

is normally abuse of discretion.

Shurtleft v. Jay Tuft & Co.,

622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980).
On the other hand, it appears that the trial court
misunderstood the law.

The trial court supposed that expert

testimony could not be received on an ultimate issue.
268, Lines 3-10.)

(See Tr.

If the court bases its conclusion on a

misunderstanding of the law, discretion is abused.

Wingert v.

W.C.A.B., 468 A.2d 526, 528 (Pa. App. 1983); Schmid v. Olsen,
330 N.W.2d 547, 552 (Wise. 1983).
9

POINT TWO
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO GIVE
INSTRUCTIONS ON PER SE NEGLIGENCE
The Court gave three jury instructions on p€?r se negligence:
Instruction No- 14^ deals with right of way.

After

explaining the law on right of way, the instruction concludes:
Failure to yield the right of way under such
circumstance is negligence. . .
Instruction No. 17*3 deals with duties of a driver making a
left hand turn.

After stating the law on left hand turns, the

instruction concludes:
Failure to operate a vehicle in accordance
with the foregoing requirements of the law is
negligence on the part of the driver.
Instruction No. 18^ deals with a driver's duties where a
barrier or median is painted on the pavement.

The Court

concluded the instruction by stating:
Failure to operate a vehicle in accordance
with the foregoing requirements of the law is
negligence on the part of the driver. . .
A.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR INSTRUCTING JURY.
This type of instruction is generally referred to as a

per se instruction.

That is to say negligence automatically

folLows if the statute is violated.

2

.

See Exhibit A. (R. 1642.)

3

.

See Exhibit B.

(R. 1645.)

4

.

See Exhibit C.

(R. 1646.)
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However, Utah has never adopted the per se rule.^

Rather,

Utah courts have consistently followed a rule of prima facia
negligence.

See Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 395 P.2d 62,

16 Utah 2d 30 (1964) and cases cited therein.
The doctrine of prima facia negligence generally means that:
Prima facia evidence. . . merely meets the
minimum question of evidence necessary for a
party to prevail if the evidence remains
unrebutted. . . Once the trier of fact is
faced with conflicting evidence it must
weigh "the prima facia evidence with all of
the other evidence presented."
[all citations omitted.]
Godesky v. Provo City Corp.y 690 P.2d 541f 547 (Utah 1984).

See

also Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981).
Failure to correctly instruct the jury on prima facia
negligence is prejudicial error.

Intermountain Farmers

Association v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1978).
B.

FACTUAL BASIS FOR INSTRUCTING THE JURY

In this case, the truck driver, Lingle, put on evidence that
Gaw was prima facia negligent by turning left onto the highway.
Prima facia negligence means that her conduct,

~>.
In the trial court defendant Lingle relied on a series
of California cases. California does follow the per se rule.
See e^g^ Faqerquist v. Western Sun Aviation, Inc., 2 36 Cal.Rep.
633 (1987) .
11

. . . is subject to justification or excuse
if the evidence is such that it could
reasonably be found that the conduct wcis
nevertheless within the standard of
reasonableness under the circumstances.
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 364 P.2d at 64.
Assuming arguendo that there was evidence of prima facia
negligence, there was still abundant evidence to show
"justification or excuse."

Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., supra.

A

brief sketch of the evidence on "justification or excuse"
follows^:
Gaw's expert was a human factors research scientist.^

The

expert testified that the traffic intersection wcis very unusual.
(Tr. 290, Line 24.)^ There was a high probability that Gaw was
not aware of a safe manner of negotiating the intersection.
292, Lines 12-15.)

(Tr.

In fact, Gaw only did what would have been

typical for other drivers using the intersection.. (Tr. 297, Lines
2-8.)

Furthermore Gaw's conduct was reasonable in view of the

confusing pavement markings.

(Tr. 245, Lines 1-6; 246, Lines 14-

22. )

b

.
Note: This outline of evidence is included here for
the sole purpose of showing that there was a factual basis for
giving the jury instruction. For a more complete survey of the
evidence, see Point One, above.
'.
For further discussion of human factors research see
Point One, above.
°.
A sketch of the intersection is found at Exhibit D.
(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 1.)
12

If the jury believed this version of the evidence, they
could easily have found "justification or excuse" for Gaw's
conduct.

However, the court's instruction on per se negligence

failed to give the jury that option.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING
THE STATE OF UTAH
Gaw sued the truck driver (Lingle) as well as the State of
Utah.

The theory against the State of Utah was that the

intersection was improperly designed.

(R. 511.)

In the latter stages of the litigation, the State of Utah
filed a motion for summary judgment.
simple.

The theory was relatively

The State of Utah, citing portions of Gaw's deposition,

stated that she was not confused when she entered the
intersection.^

The summary judgment was based upon the following

language in Gaw's deposition:

y

.
Before filing the deposition with the court, Gaw
clarified that testimony as permitted by Rule 30(e) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. In an unusual ruling, the trial court judge
suppressed the changes. See Order Suppressing Changes to
Plaintiff's Deposition. (R. 790-791.)
For a case permitting such deposition changes see Allen and
Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337 (S.D.N.Y 197_)\
Gaw also filed an affidavit clarifying her testimony. (R.
109 3.) The trial court likewise suppressed that affidavit. (R.
1352.) For a case permitting such an affidavit to be filed, see
Lane v. Celotex Corp., 782 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1986); Compare
Tippens v. Celotex Coip., 805 F.2d 949 (11th Cir. 1986).
i 1

Q.

At this time do you have any memory or do you feel that
you were confused by any of these lines in the
intersection?

A.

Not that I remember. There was - they didn't ever
bother me before and I don't remember.

(Fay Gaw Deposition, p. 81.)
The trial judge agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of
the State of Utah.

(See Memorandum Decision, R. 1352-1354,

attached as Exhibit E.)
However, Gaw also testified in the same deposition that:
Q.

Is there anything about the intersection markings or
signs that you were unable to understand?

A.

Well, it was always confusing there, the way they had
lines going that way, this way, and which way.

Q.

What was the confusion?

A.

Well, you really just had to watch what you're doing
and stay in your lane and watch where your going,
because they were always marked crazy.

(Gaw Deposition at p. 59.)
The trial court should not have taken one comment out of
context to conclude that Fay Gaw was confused. ^

It is well

settled that,

The court's Memorandum Decision states:
"An examination of the deposition of the
plaintiff shows that she was not confused by
any of the lines on the highway or anything
else at the intersection prior to the
accident." (R. 1353, attached as Exhibit
G.)
14

[D]oubts or uncertainties concerning issues
of fact properly presented or the nature of
inferences to be drawn from the facts, are to
be construed in the light most favorable to
[Gaw].
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah,
1983") .
(Emphasis added.)
Moreover, there was expert testimony that Gaw was confused.
At the summary judgment hearing, plaintiff presented an expert's
affidavit 11 that stated:
In my opinion, this highway design
contributed to confusion on the part of Mrs.
Gaw, and was a contributing cause to the
accident.
(R. 1330 attached hereto as Exhibit F.)
Finally, human nature is such that people who are confused
usually do not realize that they are confused.

At a later

portion of the trial, the human factors expert testified to what
should have been self evident to the trial court:
Q.

Another thing, when she testified
[in the deposition]: "Were you
confused?" and she said: "No."
What does that mean to a Human
Factors Scientist?

11

. The trial court stated that this affidavit did not have
a proper foundation, and that the affidavit did not state the
appropriate standard of conduct. (See Exhibit H.) However, in
the attached copy, the areas of foundation and standard of care
are highlighted for the convenience of the Court. (See Exhibit
I.) The affidavit easily qualifies. Compare American Concepts
Ins. Co. v. Lochead, 78 Ut. Adv.Rptr. 27, 751 P.2d 271.
15

A.

Well, a person can be mislead, in
which case they're not aware. And
if they're not aware they're
mislead, that in that sense,
they're really not confused -- from
the standpoint of someone on the
outside looking at what happened
and saying: "Well, if she did
that, it's very likely she was
confused but didn't know it." You
see, that's the difference. I'm
more comfortable with the term
'misled,' than I am 'confused;'
because some connotations of the
word 'confused' would indicate that
the person was aware that they were
confused. But -- There's some
differences between those two
terms.

(Tr. 308, Lines 6-19.)
In summary, the State of Utah was dismissed because of an
isolated comnient in the deposition that Gaw was not confused.
However, that statement was taken out of context.

Further, it is

self evident that a person can be misled without knowing it.
Finally, there is expert testimony in the record that Gaw was
confused (or misled).
POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON THE TRUCK DRIVER'S DUTY OF DUE CARE
The judge instructed the jury on the law of the right of
way.12

However, the instruction is incomplete.

Instruction No.

14 fails to advise the jury of the duty of the favored driver

See Instruction No. 14, attached as Exhibit A.
lfi

(Lingle) to exercise due care.

See e.g. Phillips v. Tooele City

Corp., 500 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1972):
The emphasis upon the preferred status of
either driver will not resolve the issue, for
this right is not absolute, and one who has
the right of way may not exercise it in the
face of danger, which one exercising due care
would see and avoid.
Even though Lingle was the favored driver, his duty of due
care was significant for three reasons:

First, there was

evidence that the truck driver (Lingle) was traveling from 70-75
miles per hour.

(Tr. 169, Lines 12-13.)

There was further

evidence of a yellow flashing light (caution) at the
intersection.

(Plaintiff's'Exhibit 45. ) "

Finally, there was

evidence that Gaw was attempting to negotiate a very confusing
intersection.

(Tr. 290, Lines 19-25; 291, Lines 1-10; 292, Lines

3-8. )
Failure to instruct the jury that the favored driver still
has a duty of due care was prejudicial error.

DATED this

(Jy^

day of

^//Ltlj^

J

1989.

/[

ROBERT JV DE0RY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellant
BY

1

^.

•MmM^^i

This is a highway department Photolog.
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Exhibit A

INSTRUCTION NO. _[
*

When the law makes it the duty of a driver of one
vehicle to yield the right of way to a second vehicle, that duty
arises as soon as the two vehicles are close enough to each other
to constitute an immediate hazard.

Such a hazard exists whenever

a reasonably prudent person in the position of the driver of the
first vehicle, would apprehend the probability of colliding with
the second vehicle if the driver of the first vehicle attempted
to proceed on the intended course of travel.

Failure to yield

the right of way under such circumstances is negligence.

Exhibit B

i

INSTRUCTION NO. J

The operator of a vehicle intending to turn left shall
turn onto the roadway being entered, in the extreme left hand
available lane for traffic moving in the new direction for
travel.
Failure to operate a vehicle in accordance with the
foregoing requirements of the law is negligence on the part of
the driver.

Exhibit C

INSTRUCTION NO.
A vehicle may not be operated over, across, or within
any painted or other dividing space, median or barrier of a
divided highway

if such space or median is clearly visible to a

reasonably observant person, except where authorized by an
official traffic control device or peace officer.
Failure to operate a vehicle in accordance with the
foregoing requirements of the law is negligence on the part of
the driver.

Exhibit D
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Exhibit E

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C^RT^^uC^B^bffOUNTY
STATE OF UTAHp^'^'y^''^' ^lyi ^o
,
.
' • -M-Y
gL
FAY GAW,
)
Plaintiff,
VS.

)
)
)

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
)
its Department of Transportation,)
CARBON COUNTY, CITY OF HELPER,
)
JIMMY WRAY LINGLE, ALLSTATE
)
INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois
)
corporation, and JOHN DOES I
)
through X,
)
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. 14630

)

The defendant, State of Utah, has moved for summary
judgment in its favor contending that there are no issues of
material fact relative to this defendant and that the plaintiff
has no cause of action against the State of Utah.

The Court

has received the parties1 Memorandums of Legal Points and
Authorities, considered the Affidavits submitted and the
published Depositions, and heard oral arguments of the parties
and rules on the State's Motion as hereinafter stated.
The State defendant has also moved the Court to
strike the Affidavit of Mr. Beaufort on several grounds. It
would appear to the Court that the plaintiff has not complied
with Rule 2.8 of the Uniform Rules of Practice for the District
Court in submitting the various memorandums and affidavits that
the plaintiff has filed, but the Court will not strike the

Affidavits of Mr. Beaufort as it relates to the Motion of the
State since the Court feels that the Motion can be disposed of
without that necessity.
An examination of the Deposition of the plaintiff
shows that she was not confused by any of the lines on the
highway or anything else at the intersection prior to the
accident.

The statements are definite and the Court will not

allow her to change those statements by affidavits submitted
after the time of her deposition since she has offered no
explanation as to why she would be mistaken at the time of her
deposition.
The affidavits submitted to try to demonstrate that
there was a faulty highway design state conclusions without
foundation as to the highway design and they do not specify
what standards the State did not follow or should have followed
in this instance.
Therefore, the Court finds that it is undisputed
that the plaintiff was not confused by the highway design at
the time of the accident and that the plaintiff has been unable
to produce any evidence that the highway design was faulty and
that the faulty design, if any, caused the resulting accident.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the plaintiff
does not have a cause of action against the State of Utah and
grants the Motion for Summary Judgment and the attorney for the
2

State is directed to prepare a formal judgment in accordance
with this opinion.
The defendants, Lingie and Roadrunner Trucking
Company, have also made a motion for summary judgment
contending that there are no genuine disputed issues of
material fact and that based upon those undisputed facts they
are entitled to a judgment of no cause of action.
It would appear to the Court that the first
affidavit of Mr. Beaufort, which the Court will not strike at
this time, does establish sufficient issues of fact that this
matter should be presented for trial and determination by a
fact finder.
Therefore, the Court denies the Motion of Lingie and
Roadrunner for summary judgment and the attorney for the
plaintiff is instructed to prepare a formal order in accordance
with this decision.
DATED this

day of June, 1988.
•

^

-z&^^/tfy
JUDGE

D B^JtfNELL,i&tSttlpCT

3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of
the foregoing
JUDGMENT

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

by depositing the same in the United States Mail,

postage prepaid, to the following:
Clifford C. Ross
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys at Law
650 Clark Learning Office
Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101

G. Steven Sullivan
Robert J. Debry
ROBERT J. DEBRY ASSOCIATES
Attorneys at Law
965 East 4800 So., Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

Daniel F. Bertch
Attorney at Law
6558 South Stanwick Road, #22
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

Joy Sanders
Jody Burnett
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

L. Rich Humpherys
Edward 0. Ogilvie
CHRISTENSEN JENSEN & POWELL
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
510 Clark Learning Office Center Litigation Divison
175 South West Temple
236 State Capitol Buidling
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Lewis B. Quigley
MASCARO & QUIGLEY
Attorneys at Law
7434 South State, Suite 201
Midvale, Utah
84047
DATED

this

Y/3i

Jffsf/{s?^

/

Secretary

day of June, 1988

Exhibit F

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
CARBON COUNTY. U1AH
FILED

HAY 1 2 1303
NORMAL POCHARD. CLERK
J^£^
DLPUTY

DANIEL F. BERTCH - A4728
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
;

FAY GAW,
Plaintiff,

)

AFFIDAVIT OF HOWARD
ANDERSON

)

Civil No. 14630

vs.
STATE OF UTAH, et al.
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss:

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
COMES NOW Howard Anderson, after first being duly
sworn, deposes and says:
1.

My name is Howard Anderson.

Plantation Drive, Carsen City, Nevada
2.

My address is 111

89701.

I am a licensed engineer and have testified as

an expert in highway design approximately Q Q

times. A copy

of my curriculum vitae is attached.
3.

I have been asked to review and analyze the

intersection of Poplar Avenue and Route 6 in Helper, Utah.
Specifically, I have been asked to analyze the intersection

with regard to motorists turning left from Poplar Avenue onto
Route 6.
4.

I have been provided a diagram of the layout

of the Route 6-Poplar Avenue intersection.
of

that diagram

is attached to this affidavit.

reviewed the police reports and photographs.
the deposition of Fay Gaw and her affidavit.
the

traffic

court

traffic count.

A reduced copy

data

consisting

of

the

I have

I have read
I have reviewed
average

daily

These materials are customarily relied upon

by highway design professionals in analyzing the safety of an
intersection.
5.

I do not yet have complete accident data on

the intersection,

and

I do not have an hourly count of

traffic at the intersection.

Without an hourly count of

traffic, I cannot review signal warrants for the Helper area.
6.

In my opinion, the intersection design for

drivers turning left from Poplar Avenue onto Route 6 fails to
meet accepted standards of safety in highway design.

As a

result of these failures, the intersection is defective and
dangerous for motorists turning left onto Route 6.

The

reasons for my opinions are set forth in more detail in the
following paragraphs.

2

7.

There are three major intersections in Helper.

They all have relatively heavy turning movements and all are
intersections without active traffic control devices.

In

looking at the traffic movements and the high speed road
onditions

on

Route

6,

in my

opinion, one of the three

intersections should be signalized (i.e. hve a traffic signal
installed) .

Even if traffic movements on any one of the

local streets did not meet all the hourly warrants for a
signal, the signal should be installed because:
a.

A signal would facilitate crossing movements
at the intersection.

For example, a vehicle

must accelerate approximately 80 feet from the
stop bar on Poplar Avenue to clear the far
side of the intersection.

This requires a

long gap in traffic and good judgment on the
part

of

the

local

drivers

crossing

this

totally unpatrolled high speed highway.
b.

A signal would inform motorists on Route 6
that

they

are

entering

a

community

where

frequent traffic conflicts can be expected.
c.

Most importantly, a signal at any one of the
Helper

intersections

would

provide

gaps for the other two intersections.
3

traffic

8.

The striping and the islands are inadequate

and pose a challenge to even a frequent user of the intersection.

An infrequent or first-time user can easily be mislead

into making the wrong decision.

Traffic leaving Poplar

Avenue and turning left onto Route 6 is a relatively high or
heavy movement of about 1200 vehicles per day.

At conven-

tional divided highways such as Route 6, that left turn
movement would

be made onto the far side of the median

(shaded in red on the attached diagram), directly into the
through lane, or into an acceleration lane located directly
next to the through lane.

That would be a driver's normal

expectancy, and the normal intersection design.
9.

I have never seen a four legged intersection

with a merge lane on the near side of a median, except at
Helper, Utah.

Traffic turning left from Poplar Avenue onto

Route 6 must turn prior to reaching the divided island, and
at that point, conflicts with traffic turning left from Route
6 onto Hill Street.

ThiS left turn movement onto Hill Street

at times will block the movement of Poplar Avenue traffic
onto Route 6.
10.

The

intersection

layout

separates

traffic

traveling in the same direction with an island median, while
separating traffic traveling in opposite directions with a
4

stripe median.

This is totally in conflict with normal

engineering practices.

This conflict can and will fail to

meet reasonable driver expectancy.

In my opinion, this

highway design led to confusion on the part of Mrs. Gaw, and
was a contributing cause to the accident.
11. As a final comment, I have not yet had an
opportunity to visit the accident scene.

My opinions are

subject to some modification after I make further analysis
and obtain all the facts.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
of

^~fV)(^

#

#

*-.v
ff7 V /

-

~

/l^h

day

r 1988.

NOTARY ^/PUBLIC

^

Residing a t :

M#' C<Lm%$S$ E*p:
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the_

/#«

_day of_

o

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
HOWARD R. ANDERSON (Gaw v. State of Utah) postage prepaid, by
depositing a copy of the same in the U.S. mail, to the
following:
Joy Sanders
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah
Clifford C. Ross
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Doug Bayly
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
175 South West Temple #510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
S~\

Howard L. Anderson
Consulting Engineer
Highway Safety and Design
111 Plantation Dr.
Carson City, Nevada 89701
DATE OF BIRTH
October 24, 1921
EDUCATION
3940
California School of Aeronautics
1946-48 University of California at Los Angeles
1948-49 University of California at Berkeley, B.S. Civil
Engineering
1971
Industrial College of Armed Forces
MILITARY RECORD
1942-46 Pilot, U.S. Naval Air Corps, Lt. s.g.
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS & SOCIETIES
Institute of Transportation Engineers
American Society of Civil Engineers
Registered Professional Engineer - Alabama
American Association for Automotive Medicine
Transportation Research Board
Commonwealth Club of California - Transportation Section
National Safety Council
HONORS
Superior Achievement Award - Federal Highway Administration
(DOT)
Trail Blazer Award - 3M Company
PUBLICATIONS
"Teamwork Can Reduce Transportation Accidents", Traffic Safety
National Safety Council Publication, Jan. 1976.
"Dispelling a Myth, A Viewpoint on Highway Safety", U.S.
DeDt. of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration,
Dec. 1976.
"Federal Approach to Highway Safety11, U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, August, 1978.
"A Final Word on Safety", U.S. Dept. of Transportation,
Federal Highway Administration, Sept., 1°79.
"The Traffic Engineer and Highway Safety", ITE Journal,
Nov. 1979.

PRESENTATIONS TO PROFESSIONAL GROUPS
"The Future of Transportation in the United States as It
Effects the Environment", Environmental Conference (Regional)
Harrisburg, Pa,, May 1971.
"Highway Design as It Relates to the Environment in Light
of the Environmental Policy Act", WASHO Conference, San
Antonio, Texas, June 1971.
"Environmental Facts for Decision Makers", WASHO Planning
Conference, OLympia, Washington, July, 1971.
"Financing the Needs of the Indiana Highway System - The
Federal Perspective", 61st Annual Road School, Purdue
University, March, 1975.
"Motor Carrier Safety Act in Relation to Highway Safety11,
Private Truck Council, Atlanta, Georgia, April, 1976.
"Regulatory Reform and Mutual Safety Problems", Government
Regulations Conference of Truck Week, Chicago, Illinois,
June, 1976.
"Safety Problems in Relation to Research and Development
in the Federal Highway Administration", Western Regional
Meeting of ATA Council of Safety Supervisors, Jackson,
Wyoming, July, 1976.
"Let's Try to Dispel Some Highway Safety Myths", Missouri
Valley Section of Institute of Transportation Engineers,
September, 1976.
"Hazardous Materials, Regulations and Communications",
Four State Hazardous Materials and Safety Seminar, Kansas
City, MO., Sept., 1976.
"Federal Highway Administration Safety Program", National
Highway Safety Advisory Committee, Washington, D.C., Nov.
1976.
"Highway Safety and Human Factor Fallacy", Road Gang,
Washington, D.C., Nov. 1976.
"The Price of Progress", ASTA Annual Convention, Orlando,
Florida, March, 1977.
"A New Look at Safety", Hawaii Trucking Association, Maka
ha, Hawaii, Sept. 1977.
"Construction and Maintenance Zone Safety", 29th Annual
California Transportation and Public Works Conference, San
Diego, California, April 1977.

"Oakland County Challenge", Traffic Improvement Association
of Oakland County, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, April, 1977.
"Federal Highway Evaluation of Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Safety Programs", National Conference on Railroad-Highway Crossing Safety, University of Utah, August, 1977.
"Do We Have a Safety Problem on Low Volume Roads?", Transportation Research Board, January, 1978.
"Work Zone Safety", 57th Annual Meeting of Transportation
Research Board, January, 1978.
"Federal Approach to -Safety", 48th Annual Institute of
Transportation Engineers Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, August,
1978.
"Safety Problems Today and in the Future", Regional, Federal,
State and City Employeesrfrom Maryland, Virginia, W. Virginia,
Delaware and Pennsylvania, Fredricksburg, Virginia, June
1979.
"Meaningful Local Traffic Records" - The Real Challenge,
Fifth National Forum.on Traffic Records, Scottsdale, Arizona.
f
July, 1979.
"Federally Funded Transportation Programs", 49th Annual
Meeting of Institute Engineers, Toronto, Canada, Sept.
1979.
"Highway Design and Safety Practices11, WASHTO Safety Workshop, October, 1979.
"Safety Challenge for the Future", Am. Society of Civil
Engineers Specialty Conference on Highway Safety, San
Diego, CA, March, 1980.
"Death by Design", Georgia Division, Institute of Transportation Engineers Seminar, Jekyll Island, Georgia, June
1980.
"Incompatabilities Between Highway, Vehicles, and Drivers",
American Association for Automotive Medicine, Rochester,
New York, October, 1980.
"Safety and Highway Design Standards", Safety Seminar,
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, April 18-21, 1981. 26 Arab nations
and six western nations represented.

f,

Proven H ^ ^ w ^ y Safety Programs", Safety Seminar - R i y a d h ,
Saudi Arabia, April 18-21, "l9S'l.
"Why Traffic Records? 11 ', Seventh International Forum on
Traffic Records Systems, £: Petersburg Beach, F l o r i d a ,
July 13-16, 1 9 8 1 /
"Are Design Standards Strangling U s ? " , Transportation &
Traffic Engineering Executive Program, Pennsylvania State
U n i ve r s it y^ Sep te mb e r 20-25, 1981.
Testimony before Subcommittee of 0ver sight and Investigations, House Public Ivorks and Transportation Committee
on Hi ghway Sa f e t y,. Va sh ington , D C , 0c tober 2 7 , 19 81
"Truck S a f e tyff, U n i ve r s i t y of Mi ch i g an , Hi g h way Sa f e ty
Research Insti t u t e , A i i n A r b o r . M i c h i g a n , J a n u a r \ 2 4 - 2 5 ,.
1982.
"Antiquity in Highway Design", American Society of Civil
Engineers Sprin? Convention, Apri1 26-30, 198 2, I ,as Vegas ,
Nevada.
"The R e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the C i v i l Engineer in Highway S a f e t y ,
American S o c i e t y of C i v i l E n g i n e e r s , New O r l e a n s , L o u i s i a n a ,
September 1 8 - 2 l ' 1983,
1f

Work Z o ne T r a f f i c C o nt r o1 - Is sues a nd A i i s we rs ff, A me r i c an
Cone r e t e P a v e m e n t A s s o c i a t i o n ., N o v ember 16-20, 1 9 8 5 , R e n o ,
Nevada,
"Accident Records and Tort Liability", Safety Conference for State
Highway Engineering and Traffic Law Enforcement Officials, February
8-10, 1987, San Diego, California.

CAREER

EXPERIENCE

_u-ing ,r.y earl}1 career, . served as structural and
construction engineer on several bridge and highway
projects in the western part of the country for the
Bureau of Public Roads (now FHWA).
In 1954, I accepted
the. position of Division Bridge Engineer for the Bureau
in Guatemala City, Guatemala, Central America.
During
this four year assignment, I supervised the Guatemalan
project engineers involved in the construction of the
'major structures on the Inter-American Highway between
the Mexican border and Huehuetenango and Guatemala City
and San Salvador. This process involved not only supervision but also training since most: of the Guatemalan
engineers had 11 111 P or no experience Ln contracting
procedures.
In 1958 I returned to California as design- engineer for the
division office of GHWA in Sacramento. At this time, the
Interstate Highway program was just getting underway, and
I worked closely with the State of California Design,
Traffic and Planning sections in the design and development of the San Diego and Golden State Freeways in Los
Angeles and Interstate Routes 680 and 880 in Northern
California and the initiation of 1-15 relocation around
San Bernardino to San Diego, The 1-15 relocation is
presently under construction after 15 years of R/W and
environmental studies
In 1963 I assumed the position of Div ision Administrator
in Carson City, Nevada. Prior to my tenure in Nevada, the
state had not designed any urban freeways nor constructed
any concrete highways in its past. Between 1962 and 1968.
Interstate 80 design was completed and contracts awarded
for its construction through Reno, and Interstate 15 was
designed and constructed through Las Vegas. Nevada also
started an extensive program of safety upgrading and improvement on both the interstate and local road systems.
in 1963 and 196 5 through a procedure we developed to reduce
much of the red tape that normally existed in this type
of work.
In 1969 I became Design Engineer for the Region in San
Francisco which included the states of California, Nevada,
Arizona and Hawaii, and in this capacity, for two years,
I was able to influence the adoption of more liberal design
and safety standards in all of these sta-tes. One example
of this is the adoption by all of the states in 1969 of the
Concrete Median Barrier and the installation of attenuators
o n a 1 1 g o re ar sas t h at wer e o n ne v1y cons t r u ct e d st ruc t ures.

j ^acj t ^ e opportunity in 1971 to broaden my experience and
accepted a position in the Washington headquarters office
as Division Chief of the Environment and Design Research
Division in the Office of Research. In this capacity, I
supervised approximately 35 research engineers, many with
advanced degrees in engineering, physics, hydraulics and
economics. We initiated research into the. accommodation
of the 80,000 pound truck on the Interstate and got
deeply involved in air, water, and noise pollution studies.
Promotion to the Director of the Office of Development
followed in 1972 and in the supervision of the 60 professionals in the office, we reorganized the personnel to
be more responsive to the needs of the field offices
and state highway departments. An Implementation Division
was established to work closely with the field offices and
to screen recent research results to determine how best to
get new technology into use. Training courses in noise
and air pollution were developed. A contract was awarded
to develop a guide for designing traffic barriers. T"I: ;is
guide has since been adopted by AASHT0 as basic policy.
Testing of small sign supports was undertaken and has
resulted in the prohibition of 3" pipe and back to back
tPposts for small sign supports* further modification of
sign supports are expected,, in the future
In May of 1974, I became Regional Administrator of the
Great Lakes States, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Wisconsin, and Minnesota. In this capacity I supervised
approximately 250 personnel, largely engineers with a
sprinkling of auditors, architects, and administrative
people. In 1974 and 1975 we initiated a thorough review
of safety practices and use of accident data in both the
state highway departments and within the Bureau of Motor
Carrier Safety which controls the safety of operation of
Interstate and foreign motor carriers. As a result of
findings of the review, we established and entity within
each state to devote full time and become a focal point
for*action in improving the safety practices and policies
of both the local and state highway agencies and the
internal operation of the Federal Highway Administrate:>n,
A counterpart was also established at regional level. To
make room for these safety personnel, a number of positions
were abolished because the changing scope (less R/W work,
for example) of the highway program made them excess.

In 19? 5 , a pro mo11o n to Washington, D . C . , a s t h e f i rs t
Associate Administrator for Safety was accepted.. The
office consisted of two main areas nf responsibility.
One vas the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety which involved
supervising 60 headquarters personnel dealing with the
promulgation of research and regulations in the safety
of motor carriers in Interstate and Foreign Commerce and
the transport of hazardous materia 1 s
T1: Ie o ther r espons i bility was the highway safety standards an i the safety
construction program of FHWA.
In the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety area, we reorganized
the 123 investigators under the direction of an Officer
in Charge in each state, delegated additional responsibility
to the field in settling civil- forfeiture, and undertook
a vigorous research program into heavy vehicle operations
and started strike force activities in enforcement inspections .
Tn i "h e_fci gVjv 2 y sa fe r y standards area, w e i rnpr o v e d w o r k i n g
relationships with the Natio n a 1 H ig hw ay Traffic S a f e t y
Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board
as well as union and citizen safety groups. The Office of
Safety asserted its role in developing programs of research
to meet the future safety needs of the states and the
Federal Highway Administration. Typical of these programs
was a stepped up research program to accommodate the heavy
vehicel on our highway system and a program to develop safer
guardrails and bridge rails for both the 1800 lb. car of
the future and the school bus size vehicles.
Studies were undertaken to indicate the need for safety
engineers in our field offices. As a result of this push,
FHWA now has safer y pro g r am engineers i n vi r t u a 11y e ver)
•state * n t h e c o u n t r y .
On J u l v 1 0 , 19 7 9 , a f t e r c o m p l e t i n g 30 y e a r s of s e r v i c e
with TlrMA I r e t i r e d .
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with this opi nion.
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::e entitled to a judgment* if ^

affidavit o: L\.

--aur^ --f n ^* -on.

Beaufort, whicn the co-.;rt *- . I no: strike at

t M ^ -. : me, coer e^t^b'lirh sufficient issues of fact that this
;

j.. Q ..

^ t p r n i i n c j \ : on bv a

.. : P. :

Therefore Roadrunner for summary

judgment a..J ^..-= attOiuev

plainti f f is instruct.

prepare a formal order

w

~>^f

DATED this

accordance

dav of Tune. 1988
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D BUNNELL, i M S T ^ I C T JUDGE
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by depositing \ :he same in the United States Mail,

postage prepaid, to the following:
Clifford C. Ross
HANSON, EPPERSON & * '
Attorneys at Law
650 Clark Learning Office
Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101

G. Steven Sullivan
Robert J. Debry
ROBERT J. DEBRY ASSOCIATES
Attorneys at Law
965 East 4800 So., Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

Daniel F. Bertch
Joy Sanders
Attorney at Law
'ociy Burnett
6558 South Stanwick Road, ft J, SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
L. Rich Humpherys •
Edward 0. Ogilvie
CHRISTENSEN JENSEN & POWELL
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
510 Clark Learning Office Center Litigation Divison
175 South West Temple
236 State Capitol Buidling
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Lewis B. Quigley
MASCARO & QUIGLEY
Attorneys at Law
7 434 South State, o-.LMidvale, Utah
84047
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FAY GAW,
Plaintiff,
1
1

vs.

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its Department of Transportation,]
CARBON COUNTY, CITY OF HELPER,
]
JIMMY WRAY LINGLE, ALLSTATE
INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois
corporation, and JOHN DOES I
\
through X,
i

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. 14630

Defendants.
The defendant, State of Utah, has moved for summary
judgment in its favor contending that there are no issues of
material fact relative to this defendant and that the plaintiff
has no cause of action against the State of Utah.

The Court

has received the parties1 Memorandums of Legal Points and
Authorities, considered the Affidavits submitted and the
published Depositions, and heard oral arguments of the parties
and rules on the State's Motion as hereinafter stated.
The State defendant has also moved the Court to
strike the Affidavit of Mr. Beaufort on several grounds. It
would appear to the Court that the plaintiff has not complied
with Rule 2.8 of the Uniform Rules of Practice for the District
Court in submitting the various memorandums and affidavits that
the plaintiff has filed, but the Court will not strike the

Affidavits of Mr. Beaufort as it relates to the Motion of the
State since the Court feels that the Motion can be disposed of
without that necessity.
An examination of the Deposition of the plaintiff
shows that she was not confused by any of the lines on the
highway or anything else at the intersection prior to the
accident.

The statements are definite and the Court will not

allow her to change those statements by affidavits submitted
after the time of her deposition since she has offered no
explanation as to why she would be mistaken at the time of her
deposition.
The affidavits submitted to try to demonstrate that
there was a faulty highway design state conclusions without
foundation as to the highway design and they do not specify
what standards the State did not follow or should have followed
in this instance.
Therefore, the Court finds that it is undisputed
that the plaintiff was not confused by the highway design at
the time of the accident and that the plaintiff has been unable
to produce any evidence that the highway design was faulty and
that the faulty design, if any, caused the resulting accident.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the plaintiff
does not have a cause of action against the State of Utah and
grants the Motion for Summary Judgment and the attorney for the
2

State is directed to prepare a formal judgment in accordance
with this opinion.
The defendants, Lingle and Roadrunner Trucking
Company, have also made a motion for summary judgment
contending that there are no genuine disputed issues of
material fact and that based upon those undisputed facts they
are entitled to a judgment of no cause of action.
It would appear to the Court that the first
affidavit of Mr. Beaufort, which the Court will not strike at
this time, does establish sufficient issues of fact that this
matter should be presented for trial and determination by a
fact finder.
Therefore, the Court denies the Motion of Lingle and
Roadrunner for summary judgment and the attorney for the
plaintiff is instructed to prepare a formal order in accordance
with this decision.
DATED this

/T

<Z

day of June, 1988.
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AFFIDAVIT OF HOWARD
ANDERSON

• . • •]

.

STATE OF UTAH, et al.

]
)

Civil No. 14630

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
COMES NOW Howard Anderson, after first being duly
sworn, deposes and says:
1.

My name is Howard Anderson.

Plantation Drive, Carsen City, Nevada
2.

My address is 111

89701.

I am a licensed engineer and have testified as

an expert in highway design approximately o p

times. A copy

of my curriculum vitae is attached.
3.

I have been asked to review and analyze the

intersection of Poplar Avenue and Route 6 in Helper, Utah.
Specifically, I have been asked to analyze the intersection

•ftf

»fl££>

with regard to motorists turning left from Poplar Avenue onto
N

Route 6 .
4.

' ^

'

.

I have been provided a diagram of the layout

of the Route 6-Poplar Avenue intersection.
of that diagram

is attached to this affidavit.

reviewed the police reports and photographs.
the deposition of Fay Gaw and her affidavit.
the

traffic

court

traffic count.

A reduced copy

data

consisting

of

the

I have

I have read
I have reviewed
average daily

These materials are customarily relied upon

by highway design professionals in analyzing the safety of an
intersection.
5.
the

I do not yet have complete accident data on

intersection, and

I do not have an hourly count of

traffic at the intersection.

Without an hourly count of

traffic, I cannot review signal warrants for the Helper area.
6.

In my opinion, the intersection design for

drivers turning left from Poplar Avenue onto Route 6 fails to
meet accepted standards of safety in highway design.

As a

result of these failures, the intersection is defective and
dangerous for motorists turning left onto Route 6.

The

reasons for my opinions are set forth in more detail in the
following paragraphs.

2

7.

There are three major intersections in Helper.

They all have relatively heavy turning movements and all are
intersections without active traffic control devices.

In

looking at the traffic movements and the high speed road
onditions

on Route

6,

in my opinion, one of the three

intersections should be signalized (i.e. hve a traffic signal
installed) .

Even if traffic movements on any one of the

local streets did not meet all the hourly warrants for a
signal, the signal should be installed because:
a.

A signal would facilitate crossing movements
at the intersection.

For example, a vehicle

must accelerate approximately 80 feet from the
stop bar on Poplar Avenue to clear the far
side of the intersection.

This requires a

long gap in traffic and good judgment on the
part

of

the

local

drivers

crossing

this

totally unpatrolled high speed highway.
b.

A signal would inform motorists on Route 6
that

they

are

entering

a

community

where

frequent traffic conflicts can be expected.
c.

Most importantly, a signal at any one of the
Helper

intersections

would

provide

gaps for the other two intersections.
3

traffic

8.

The striping and the islands are inadequate

and pose a challenge to even a frequent user of the intersection.

An iri'requent or first-time user can easily be mislead

into making the wrong decision.

Traffic leaving Poplar

Avenue and turning left onto Route 6 is a relatively high or
heavy movement of about 1200 vehicles per day.

At conven-

tional divided

highways such as Route 6, that left turn

movement would

be made onto the far side of the median

(shaded in red on the attached diagram), directly into the
through lane, or into an acceleration lane located directly
next to the through lane.

That would be a driver's normal

expectancy, and the normal intersection design.
9.

I have never seen a four legged intersection

with a merge lane on the near side of a median, except at
Helper, Utah.

Traffic turning left from Poplar Avenue onto

Route 6 must turn prior to reaching the divided island, and
at that point, conflicts with traffic turning left from Route
6 onto Hill Street.

ThiS left turn movement onto Hill Street

at times will block the movement of Poplar Avenue traffic
onto Route 6.
10.

The

intersection

layout

separates

traffic

traveling in the same direction with an island median, while
separating traffic traveling in opposite directions with a
4

0yf

-4/
stripe median.

This is totally in conflict with normal

engineering practices.

This conflict can and will fail to

meet reasonable driver expectancy.

In my opinion, this

highway design led to confusion on the part of Mrs. Gaw, and
was a contributing cause to the accident.
11. As a final comment,

I have not yet had an

opportunity to visit the accident scene.

My opinions are

subject to some modification after I make further analysis
and obtain all the facts.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
of

^-fY)Cuj

day

, 1988.

> ^

NOTARY ^PUBLIC

59

Residing at:

/<>>

4 aLNttiUX. EXpiks :
tf : PUBUC
y

5

.
^L6jJ-

*
,'T^Jp

MAILING CERTIFICATE
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IWtL

:DA\
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT
OF

HOWARD R. ANDERSON (Gaw v. State of Utah) postage prepaid, by
depositing a copy of the same in the U.S. mail, to the
following:
Joy Sanders
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah
Clifford C. Ross
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Doug Bayly
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
175 South West Temple #510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Howard L. Anderson
Consulting Engineer
Highway Safety and Design
111 Plantation Dr.
Carson City, Nevada 89701
DATE OF BIRTH
October 24, 1921
EDUCATION
3940
California School of Aeronautics
1946-48 University of California at Los Angeles
1948-49 University of California at Berkeley, B.S. Civil
Engineering
1971
Industrial College of Armed Forces
MILITARY RECORD
1942-46 Pilot, U.S. Naval Air Corps, Lt. s.g.
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS & SOCIETIES
Institute of Transportation Engineers
American Society of Civil Engineers
Registered Professional Engineer - Alabama
American Association for Automotive .Medicine
Transportation Research Board
Commonwealth Club of California - Transportation Section
National Safety Council
HONORS
Superior Achievement Award - Federal Highway Administration
(DOT)
Trail Blazer Award - 3M Company
PUBLICATIONS
M
Teamwork Can Reduce Transportation Accidents", Traffic Safety
National Safety Council Publication, Jan. 1976.
''Dispelling a Myth, A Viewpoint on Highway Safety", U.S.
Dept. of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration,
Dec. 1976.
"Federal Approach to Highway Safety", U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, August, 1978.
"A Final Word on Safety", U.S. Dept. of Transportation,
Federal Highway Administration, Sept., 1979.
"The Traffic Engineer and Highway Safety", ITE Journal,
Nov. 1979.

PRESENTATIONS TO PROFESSIONAL GROUPS
"The Future of Transportation in the United States as It
Effects the Environment", Environmental Conference (Regional)
Harrisburg, Pa., May 1971.
"Highway Design as It Relates to the Environment in Light
of the Environmental Policy Act", WASHO Conference, San
Antonio, Texas, June 1971.
"Environmental Facts for Decision Makers", WASHO Planning
Conference, OLympia, Washington, July, 1971.
"Financing the Needs of the Indiana Highway System - The
Federal Perspective", 61st Annual Road School, Purdue
University, March, 1975.
"Motor Carrier Safety Act in Relation to Highway Safety",
Private Truck Council, Atlanta, Georgia, April, 1976.
"Regulatory Reform and Mutual Safety Problems", Government
Regulations Conference of Truck Week, Chicago, Illinois,
June, 1976.
"Safety Problems in Relation to Research and Development
in the Federal Highway Administration", Western Regional
Meeting of ATA Council of Safety Supervisors, Jackson,
Wyoming, July, 1976.
"Let's Try to Dispel Some Highway Safety Myths'1, Missouri
Valley Section of Institute of Transportation Engineers,
September, 1976.
"Hazardous Materials, Regulations and Communications",
Four State Hazardous Materials and Safety Seminar, Kansas
City, MO., Sept., 1976.
"Federal Highway Administration Safety Program", National
Highway Safety Advisory Committee, Washington, D.C, Nov.
1976.
"Highway Safety and Human Factor Fallacy", Road Gang,
Washington, D.C, Nov. 1976.
"The Price of Progress", ASTA Annual Convention, Orlando,
Florida, March, 1977.
"A New Look at Safety", Hawaii Trucking Association, Maka
ha, Hawaii, Sept. 1977.
"Construction and Maintenance Zone Safety", 29th Annual
California Transportation and Public Works Conference, San
Diego, California, April 1977.

"Oakland County Challenge", Traffic Improvement Association
of Oakland County, Bloornfield Hills, Michigan, April, 1977.
"Federal Highway Evaluation of Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Safety Programs", National Conference on Railroad-Highway Crossing Safety, University of Utah, August, 1977.
"Do We Have a Safety Problem on Low Volume Roads?", Transportation' Research Board, January, 1978.
"Work Zone Safety", 57th Annual Meeting of Transportation
Research Board, January, 1978.
"Federal Approach to -Safety", 48th Annual Institute of
Transportation Engineers Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, August,
1978.
"Safety Problems Today and in the Future", Regional, Federal,
State and City Employeesrfrom Maryland, Virginia, W. Virginia,
Delaware and Pennsylvania, Fredricksburg, Virginia, June
1979.
"Meaningful Local Traffic Records" - The Real Challenge,
Fifth National Forum on Traffic Records, Scottsdale,.Arizona.
f
July, 1979.
"Federally Funded Transportation Programs", 49th Annual
Meeting of Institute Engineers, Toronto, Canada, Sept.
1979.
"Highway Design and Safety Practices", WASHTO Safety Workshop, October, 1979.
"Safety Challenge for the Future", Am. Society of Civil
Engineers Specialty Conference on Highway Safety, San
Diego, CA, March, 1980.
"Death by Design", Georgia Division, Institute of Transportation Engineers Seminar, Jekyll Island, Georgia, June
1980.
"Incompatabilities Between Highway, Vehicles, and Drivers",
American Association for Automotive Medicine, Rochester,
New York, October, 1980.
"Safety and Highway Design Standards", Safety Seminar,
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, April 18-21, 1981. 26 Arab nations
and six western nations represented.

"Proven K*>gvw*v Safety Programs", Safety Seminar - Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia, April 18-21, 1981.
"Why Traffic Records?", Seventh International Forum on
Traffic Records Systems, St. Petersburg Beach, Florida,
July 13-16, 1981/
"Are Design Standards Strangling Us?", Transportation &
Traffic Engineering Executive Program, Pennsylvania State
University, September 20-25, 1981.
Testimony before Subcommittee of Oversight and Investigations, House Public Works and Transportation Committee
on Highway Safety,. Washington, D.C.", October 27, 1981.
"Truck Safety", University of Michigan, Highway Safety
Research Institute, Ann Arbor- Michigan, Januarv 24-25,
1982.
"Antiquity in Highway Design", American Society of Civil
Engineers Spring Convention, April 26-30, 1982, Las Vegas,
Nevada.
"The Responsibility of the Civil Engineer in Highway Safety,
American Society of Civil Engineers, New Orleans, Louisiana,
September 19-21, 1983.
"Work Zone Traffic Control - Issues and Answers", American
Concrete Pavement Association, November 16-20, 1985, Reno,
Nevada.
"Accident Records and Tort Liability", Safety Conference for State
Highway Engineering and Traffic Law Enforcement Officials, February
8-10, 1987, San Diego, California.

CAREER EXPERIENCE
During my early career, I served as structural and
construction engineer on several bridge and highway
projects in the western part of the country for the
Bureau of Public Roads (now FHWA). In 1954, I *crepted
the position of Division Bridge Engineer for the Bureau
in Guatemala City, Guatemala, Central America, During
this four year assignment, I supervised the Guatemalan
project engineers involved in the construction of the
major structures on the Inter-American Highway between
the Mexican border and Huehuetenango and Guatemala City
and San Salvador- This process involved not only supervision but also training since most of the Guatemalan
engineers had little or no experience in contracting
procedures.
In 195B I returned to California as design engineer for the
division office of GHWA in Sacramento. At this time, the
Interstate Highway program was just getting underway, and
I worked closely with the State of California Design,
Traffic and Planning sections in the design and development of the San Diego and Golden State Freeways in Los
Angeles and Interstate Routes 680 and 880 in Northern
California and the initiation of 1-15 relocation around
San Bernardino to San Diego. The 1-15 relocation is
presently under construction after 15 years of R/W and
environmental studies.
In 1963 I assumed the position of Division Administrator
in Carson City, Nevada. Prior to my tenure in Nevada, the
state had not designed any urban freeways nor constructed
any concrete highways in its past. Between 1962 and 1968
Interstate 80 design was completed and contracts awarded
for its construction through Reno, and Interstate 15 was
designed and constructed through Las Vegas. Nevada also
started an extensive program of safety upgrading and improvement on both the interstate and local road systems.
in 1963 and 1965 through a procedure we developed to reduce
much of the red tape that normally existed in this type
of work.
In 1969 I became Design Engineer for the Region in San
Francisco which included the states of California, Nevada,
Arizona and Hawaii, and in this capacity, for two years,
I was able to influence the adoption of more liberal design
and safety standards in all of these sta-tes. One example
of this is the adoption by all of the states in 1969 of the
Concrete Median Barrier and the installation of attenuators
on all gore areas that were on newly constructed structures.

I had the opportunity in 1971 to broaden my experience and
accepted a position in the Washington headquarters office
as Division Chief of the Environment and Design Research
Division in the Office of Research. In this capacity, I
supervised approximately 35 research engineers, many with
advanced degrees in engineering, physics, hydraulics and
economics. We initiated research into the. accommodation
of the 8C,000 pound truck on the Interstate and got
deeply involved in air, water, and noise pollution studies.
Promotion to the Director of the Office of Development
followed in 1972 and in. the supervision of the 60 professionals in the office, we reorganized the personnel to
be more responsive to the needs of the field offices
and state highway departments. An Implementation Division
was established to work closely with the field offices and
to screen recent research results to determine how best to
get new technology into use. Training courses in noise
and air pollution were developed. A contract was awarded
to develop a guide for designing traffic barriers. This
guide has since been adopted by AASHTO as basic policy.
Testing of small sign supports was undertaken ard has .
resulted in the prohibition of 3" pipe and back to back
IFposts for small sign supports. Further modification of
sign supports are expected in the future.
In May of 1974, I became Regional Administrator of the
Great Lakes States, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Wisconsin, and Minnesota. In this capacity I supervised
approximately 250 personnel, largely engineers with a
sprinkling of auditors, architects, and administrative
people. In 1974 and 1975 we initiated a thorough review
of safety practices and use of accident data in both the
state highway departments and within the Bureau of Motor
Carrier Safety which controls the safety of operation of
Interstate and foreign motor carriers. As a result of
findings of the review, we established and entity within
each state to devote full time and become a focal point
for action in improving the safety practices and policies
of both the local and state highway agencies and the
internal operation of the Federal Highway Administration.
A counterpart was also established at regional level. To
make room for these safety personnel, a number of positions
were abolished because the changing scope (less R/W work,
for example) of the highway program made them excess.

In 1975, a promotion to Washington, D.C., as the first
Associate Administrator for Safety was accepted. . The
office consisted of two main areas of responsibility.
One was the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety which involved
supervising 60 headquarters personnel dealing with the
promulgation of research and regulations in the safety
of motor carriers in Interstate and Foreign Commerce and
the transport of hazardous materials. The other responsibility was the highway safety standards and the safety
construction program of FHWA.
In the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety area, we reorganized
the 123 investigators under the direction of an Officer
in Charge in each state, delegated additional responsibility
to the field in settling civil forfeiture, and undertook
a vigorous research program into heavy vehicle operations
and started strike force activities in enforcement inspections.
In the highway safety standards area, we improved working
relationships with the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board
as well as union and citizen safety groups. The Office of
Safety asserted its role in developing programs of research
to meet the future safety needs of the states and the
Federal Highway Administration. Typical of these programs
was a stepped up research program to accommodate the heavy
vehicel on our highway system and a program to develop safer
guardrails and bridge rails for both'the 1800 lb. car of
the future and the school bus size vehicles.
Studies were
engineers in
FHWA now has
state *n the

undertaken to indicate the need for safety
our field offices. As a result of this push,
safety program engineers in virtually every
country.

On Julv 10, 1979, after completing 30 years of service
with FHWA. I retired.

GUEST LECTURER
Pennsylvania State University - 1981
University, of Michigan - 1981

